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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of 
SUMMERS CHILDREN, 
Persons under 18 years of age 
ORIN JOHN WULFFENSTEIN, 
Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action terminating the parental rights of Orin 
John Wulffehstein to Tammy Summers (born 6-23-70) and Tina Marie 
Summers (born 7-18-71), pursuant to the Utah termination of 
parental rights statute, Utah Code Annotated, section 55-10-109 
(1953) . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a full evidentiary hearing the Second District 
Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County ordered that Appellant's 
parental rights be terminated. The Juvenile Court later denied 
Appellant's Motion to Produce Additional Testimony and Alterna-
tive Request for New Trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the orders of the Juvenile Court 
affirmed, both as to the termination of Appellant's parental 
rights and the denial of the Motion to Produce Additional 
Testimony and Request for New Trial, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent accepts Appellant's Statement of Facts with 
the following exceptions: First, Respondent would poin : out 
that a hearing to terminate the parental rights of the mother 
in the instant case was held prior to the hearing to terminate 
the fatherfs parental rights. The fact that two separate hear-
ings were held accounts for the time elapsing between the filing 
of the petition and the actual hearing regarding termination of 
Appellant's parental rights. 
Secondly, Appellant states that he was unaware that the 
juvenile court was holding hearings on the petition to terminate 
his parental rights. However, Appellant's attorney at the hear-
ing stated to the court: "...I had received at one time a 
phone call I did not know his whereabouts, I reviewed the case 
with him and he found it impossible to appear." (Tr. 67, lines 
3-5) . 
Further, Appellant states that there are no other persons 
desiring to adopt appellant's children. There is nothing in the 
record to support this statement; in fact, the children's case-
worker testified that she had made recommendations regarding 
adoption (Tr. 19) . 
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Appellant also states that a hearing for review of the 
Order terminating his parental rights was set for September 11, 
19 75. The Findings of Fact and Decree reflect that the matter 
to be reviewed is simply the placement of the children for 
adoption, as the Order directs (R. 88-89). 
Finally, Appellant says he has an affidavit attached to 
his Brief; however, no affidavit is attached anywhere to the 
record or the Brief. 
POINT I. 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLANT ABANDONED HIS 
CHILDREN, THUS JUSTIFYING THE TERMINATION OF 
HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 55-10-109(1953). 
The trial court concluded that Appellant abandoned his 
children, based upon the following findings of fact: 
(1). Appellant's failure to provide financial 
support for the children. 
(2) Appellant's lack of contact with the children. 
(3) A lack of intent to assume custody of the 
children, and that 
(4) Appellant's whereabouts were unknown at 
the time the findings of fact were entered. 
Appellant contends that the above findings, even if true, 
do not constitute abandonment. He relies heavily upon the 
standard for abandonment set forth in In Re Adoption of Walton, 
123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), a case dealing with adoption 
without parental consent by reason of abandonment. 
In order to find abandonment the Walton court required 
that the facts show that a parent had the specific intent to 
sever all rights and duties of the parent-child relationship. 
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The court found that the facts present in Walton did not meet 
that standard. The father had made periodic support payments, 
had visited the children and had cared for them in his home for 
a one year period after his divorce from the mother. 
In the instant case Appellant has never supported his two 
children, has only visited with the children twice very briefly 
during the summer of 19 73, has not written to the children or 
their caseworker, and has not inquired as to the well-being of 
his children. 
Appellant could easily have kept in contact with the 
children and their caseworker even though he was incarcerated 
during much of the lives of the two children. The facts of the 
instant case do not fall within the Walton holding and thus are not 
controlled thereby. 
Furthermore, the Walton decision focused upon a different 
statute from the one at issue here, Utah Code Annotated, Section 
55-10-109 (.1953). The instant case speaks specifically to the 
termination of parental rights and the above statute specifies 
the elements required for abandonment in termination cases. The 
Walton case, and all other cases dealing with abandonment that 
Appellant cites, deal with adoption and not with termination of 
parental rights. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 55-10-109 (1) (.6) states that: 
(_1) The court may decree a termination 
of all parental rights with respect to one or 
both parents if the court finds: 
(b) That the parent or parents have 
abandoned the child. It shall be prima 
facie evidence of abandonment that the 
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parent or parents, although having legal 
custody of the child, have surrendered 
physical custody of the child, and for a 
period of six months following such sur-
render have not manifested to the child 
or to the person having the physical 
custody of the child a firm intention to re-
sume physical custody or to make arrange-
ments for the care of the child; 
Under this statute it is prima facie evidence of abandonment if 
a parent surrenders physical custody of his child, and for a 
period of six months thereafter manifests no firm intention to 
resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of 
the children. 
The following circumstances in the instant case come with-
in the definition of abandonment set forth in the termination 
statute: 
(1) Appellant has not had physical custody of the 
children since the birth of the second child, a 
period of five years and thus substantially longer 
that the six months required by the statute. 
(2) Appellant has failed to make any arrangements 
for the care of the children. 
By failing to inquire about the children, by failing to 
see or communicate with them Appellant has not even remotely 
manifested an intention to resume physical custody of the children. 
Although Appellant claims he was unaware of his right to 
see the children, he wrote neither to them nor to the caseworker 
in charge of their foster care. In the case of State in the 
Interest of Mario A., 514 P.2d 797 (Utah, 1973), this court stated 
We do not think the caseworkers are 
obligated to go to the extremes which 
appellant claims they should have done in 
5 
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order to kindle and increase a small 
flame of desire to be reunited with 
her children. We think if she was to 
escape the provision of the statute 
regarding evidence of abandonment, 
the duty was upon her to manifest an 
interest within the six-month period 
after loss of custody. (514 P.2d 797 
at P. 799). 
In the Mario A. case the parent claimed that the caseworker 
should have taken action to reunite her with her children, or 
at the least have provided her with the means to visit them. 
Applying the holding of Mario A. to the instant case, it is not 
the duty of the caseworker to contact Appellant with reports of 
the children when absolutely no interest has been shown. Rather 
it is the responsibility of Appellant to initiate visits or 
inquiries about the children. Appellant's incarceration was not 
an insurmountable obstacle standing in the way of showing an 
interest in his children. The trial court rightly did not permit 
Appellant to use his incarceration as an excuse. 
Finally, it is important to stress again that the record 
is devoid of any indication of intent on the part of Appellant 
to assume actual custody of the children. On the contrary, 
Appellant related to the children's caseworker has intent to 
relinquish his parental rights if he were returned to prison 
(Tr. 18) . 
In conclusion, the record in the instant case and the 
established law support the finding of the trial court that 
Appellant has abandoned his children as that term is defined in 
Utah Code Ann., Section 55-10-109(1953), and thus his parental 
rights were properly terminated by the trial court. 
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POINT II. 
THE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY FOUND 
FROM THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT APPELLANT 
IS UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT BY REASON OF CON-
DUCT OR CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL 
TO HIS TWO CHILDREN, THUS SUPPORTING THE 
TERMINATION OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS PUR-
SUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 
55-10-109 (1953). 
The trial court from the evidence presented found that 
Appellant had a long history of aggressive criminal behavior, 
that he had been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison and that 
he had escaped from the Utah State Prison. From these facts 
the court found Appellant to be emotionally unstable and unable 
to provide the security, stability and modeling necessary for 
his two children. 
Appellant challenges the above finding, arguing that the 
appropriate history to examine is the time since the birth of 
the children. Appellant states that one felony conviction and 
one parole violation since the birth of the children are not 
sufficient to support a finding of a history of criminal be-
havior. Appellant further argues that he merely left Odyssey 
House against medical advice, and thus it is error to find that 
he escaped. 
Assuming for the moment that the period of parenthood is 
the pertinent time which should be examined in regard to the 
conduct of Appellant, the record reflects that Appellant has 
been in continual trouble with the law since the birth of the 
older child, Tammy, on June 23, 1970. 
7 
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Rod Stowe, caseworker at the Utah State Industrial 
School, served as Appellant's parole officer upon his initial 
release from the Industrial School (Tr. 33-34) . He testified 
that Appellant had been reinstitutionalized at the Industrial 
School, that he had run away and was arrested and placed in the 
county jail on a juvenile court order on July 17, 1970 (Tr. 34). 
Appellant remained in the county jail, although a juvenile, be-
cause his 18th birthday was in a matter of weeks (Tr. 34). Rod 
Stowe further testified that he visited Appellant in the county 
jail in July, August and September of 1970 (Tr. 36). 
As Appellant's own Statement of Facts indicates, he was 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison from February, 1971, until 
his release on May 15, 1973. (Refer to Exhibit D, the commit-
ment order sending appellant to Utah State Prison for an in-
determinate sentence on a charge of second degree burglary.) 
Appellant was outside of prison only until July 26, 19 73, when 
he was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail. The facts in 
this case indicate that Appellant has been incarcerated during 
much of the time since the birth of his children and thus 
Appellant's claim that he does not have a long history of 
criminal behavior simply does not ring true. 
Appellant moreover cannot lightly dismiss his exit from 
Odyssey House, as he attempts to do. As Dennis Holm, district 
supervisor for adult probation and parole testified, a warrant 
was immediately issued when Appellant's unauthorized absence 
from Odyssey House became known (Tr. 7). Law enforcement agencies 
were notified of the outstanding warrant (Tr.8). Clearly 
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Appellant's history since the birth of Tammy in June, 1970, , 
and his unauthorized exit from Odyssey House fully support the 
finding of the trial court that Appellant has a history of 
aggressive criminal behavior. 
Appellant stresses the legal presumption that it will be 
for the best interests of a child to be raised by the natural 
parents. However, Appellant neglects to point out that the Utah 
Supreme Court has said that: 
Quite beyond and more important than 
the rights and privileges of the parents 
is the welfare of these children and their 
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, self-
sustaining individuals. This is the con-
sideration of paramount importance. (State 
v. Dade, 14 Utah 2d 47, 376 P.2d 948 (1962). 
Given the first responsibility of the court, that is, to 
serve the welfare of the children before it, it stands to reason 
that the court will examine any evidence which has bearing upon 
this question. If facts and circumstances existing before the 
time of parenthood offer some insight to the court as to 
whether certain conduct creates a serious detriment to the wel-
fare of children, the court in its discretion may consider this 
evidence. 
In the instant case the juvenile court did receive all 
legal documents relating to Appellant, including orders of com-
mitment to the State Industrial School (Tr. 4 7). Although some 
of these documents related to events occurring before the birth 
of the older child in June, 19 70, the court properly concluded 
that events prior to that date had a direct bearing in deter-
mining whether Appellant's conduct was sufficiently detrimental 
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to the children to support a termination of his parental rights. 
Appellant is in error in arguing that the court may only examine 
history since the birth of the minor children. Since the wel-
fare of the children is of paramount importance anything relevant 
to that issue should be admissible. 
Appellant also argues that the record reflects no correla-
tion between his aggressive criminal behavior, incarceration and 
escape on the one hand, and the effect on his children on the 
other hand. He asserts that his absence from Odyssey House has 
nothing to do with his children (Brief p. 10). 
The very arguments Appellant makes belie any assertion 
that he comprehends what it means to be a parent to Tammy and 
Tina Summers. The record amply reflects the effect of Appellant's 
conduct on his children. 
For example, Sally Patterson testified that she had been 
a foster care worker for Tina Summers since November, 1972, and 
for Tammy Summers, since approximately April, 1973 (Tr. 15). 
Miss Patterson was the first foster care worker for each of the 
children (Tr. 15). She testified that the children had been 
in foster care almost three years at the time of the hearing, 
that they needed a solid, permanent home where they can have a 
mother and father to relate to as parents, not simply foster 
parents (Tr. 19-20). 
Miss Patterson further testified that the two girls were 
becoming insecure about their foster home, wondering how long 
they would be staying (Tr. 20). As Miss Patterson related to 
court, the children were asking questions that could not be 
answered about their family situation (Tr. 20). 
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Prior to the February 5, 1975 termination of parental 
rights hearing Appellant had last visited with the two girls in 
early July, 1973 (Tr. 16). At the time of the second visit 
Appellant expressed to Miss Patterson that he did not know what 
to do with the children during the visits (Tr. 44). It is 
clear from the record Appellant did not know his children and 
they did not know him. 
Based upon her work with the two girls in the instant case 
and her assessment of the family situation, Miss Patterson 
testified that she would recommend Tina and Tammy for adoption 
(Tr. 19). 
Certainly the above testimony reflects the effect of 
Appellant's conduct and absence on the two children. The testi-
mony of Miss Patterson indicates that the uncertainty of the 
children's situation is on ther minds. The children are ques-
tioning how long they are going to continue being foster children• 
There is no relationship at all between Appellant and the two 
girls. The record thus supports a finding that Appellant's 
conduct is seriously deterimental to Tina and Tammy and any hope 
that these children have to grow up as well adjusted individuals 
in a stable environment as State v. Dade, supra, proclaims to 
be their right. 
Appellant attempts to paint a picture of himself as a blame-
less individual caught up in a situation not of his own making 
with no opportunity to come to know and support his children* 
It must be remembered that Appellant's own voluntary acts led to 
his incarceration. His own voluntary act made him a fugitive 
.• • • i i . ^ - V - . • Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from Odyssey House. His own voluntary act in violation of 
parole resulted in his return to the Utah State Prison. 
Appellant has had six years since the birth of Tammy, the 
older child, to lead a law abiding life, secure a jobf arrange 
a visitation schedule with his daughters, all with the goal of 
one day assuming the care, custody and control of the children. 
The record reflects absolutely no effort on his behalf to 
achieve that goal. Merely expressing an interest in his children 
over the last six years is not exercising the responsibilities 
that accompany parenthood. The record presents cogent evidence 
that Appellant desires all the rights of parenthood without 
exercising even a scintilla of the responsibilities. 
State v. Dade, supra, supports the proposition that the 
welfare of the children is paramount. Certainly evidence of 
Appellant's history of criminal behaviorf his incarceration in 
Utah State Prison, his escape from Odyssey House combined with 
the fact that the two children need permanent planning and 
Appellant has made no effort to provide it, all operate to 
overwhelmingly rebut any presumption in Appellant's favor. The 
welfare of Tammy and Tina require that the parental rights of 
Appellant be terminated and the children be placed for adoption 
in a permanent home at the earliest time. 
POINT III. • 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 'MOTION TO 
PRODUCE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOR A DENIAL OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
On February 5, 19 75, the first hearing was held on the 
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petition to terminate Appellant's parental rights- Qm May 9, 
19 75, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Decree 
ordering the termination. At no time during any of the pro-
ceedings between these dates did Appellant choose to appear and 
offer testimony. Instead, Appellant voluntarily absented him-
self from all proceedings, having been served and given every 
opportunity to appear and testify in his own behalf. While 
due process of law demands that every person be allowed to 
present his case and receive a full hearing upon all the evi-
dence, it does not demand that the court repeatedly delay the 
proceedings until the party finds it convenient to attend. In 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 30 Utah 2d 65 
(1973) this court stated: 
The rule that the courts will incline 
towards granting relief to a party, who 
has not had the opportunity to present his 
case, is ordinarily applied at the trial 
court level, and this court will not reverse 
the determination of the trial court merely 
because the motion could have been granted. 
For this court to overturn the discretion of 
the lower court in refusing to vacate a 
valid judgment, the requirements of public 
policy demand more than a mere statement that 
a person did not have his day in court when 
full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded 
to him or his legal representative. The movant 
must show that he has used due diligence and 
.that he was prevented from appearing by circum-
stances over which he had no control. 
In the Airkem case, as in the present case, appellant knew 
the approximate date of the hearing, and he also knew that it 
was very difficult to contact him. His failure to contact his 
attorney under these circumstances was considered by the court 
as a lack of due diligence. Appellant in the present case was 
not denied his "day in court," he simply chose to disregard it. 
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There were no circumstances beyond his control which prevented 
him from attending. He had been released from prison on parole 
and would have been able freely to appear in court/ bmt he 
violated the parole, absented himself from the area, snd failed 
to notify his attorney of his whereabouts. In such circum-
stances, there was no abuse of discretion nor denial of due 
process in refusing to grant Appellant's motion for a mew trial 
or to produce additional testimony. 
Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearings. Con-
siderable testimony was heard by the court, and the record shows 
that evidence was presented which fully supports the courts 
decision to terminate Appellant's parental rights. Appellant's 
brief stresses the reluctance of this court to sever family ties 
and also the presumption that a child is better off with his 
natural parent. However, this court has recognized, as does 
Appellant, that there are circumstances which make termination 
"the only alternative to be found consistent with the best 
interests of the children." State v. Lance, 464 P. 2d 395, 23 
U.2d 407 (1970). Therefore, the fact that policy generally does 
not favor severing family relationships does not in itself in-
dicate an abuse of discretion in refusing to vacate a termina-
tion order in favor of hearing additional testimony. According 
to Appellant's brief, an affidavit showing the testimony which 
would have been offered was presented to the trial court. Upon 
review of such an affidavit, if the court determined that their 
decision would not have been altered by such testimony, it was 
not an abuse of discretion to deny appellant's motion. In the 
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case of In Re State, 360 P.2d 486, 11 U.2d 393 (1963) , upon 
which Appellant heavily relies, this court did hold that it 
was error to deny the parent's motion to produce new testimony. 
However, in that case, the parents were proceeding unfer the 
claim that "changed conditions" made them more competent to 
care for their children. It was held to be an abuse of dis-
cretion not to investigate those changed conditions. 
The facts of the present case differ significantly. There 
were no changed conditions which would have made Appellant more 
capable of caring for his children. If anything, conditions 
had worsened in that Appellant faced an additional prison con-
finement for violation of parole. When it was obvious that 
Appellant could offer no testimony which would change the results 
of the hearings, it was not error to refuse to hear the addi-
tional testimony. 
Appellant contends that because a review hearing was set 
for September the termination order was not final until that 
date, and additional testimony could have been heard at the 
review hearing. However, Appellant misunderstands the purpose 
of such a review hearing. It is statutorily required that the 
Juvenile Court schedule a hearing for the purposes of review-
ing the status of the children, the plans which have been made 
in their behalf, and other "housekeeping" matters. It is not 
for the purpose of reconsidering the termination order; the 
order of May 9, 19 75 was a final decree. 
Appellant also advances the argument that parental rights 
should not be terminated until prospective adoptive parents 
15 
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have been found and definite plans for adoption made* Public 
policy seems to contradict such an argument* A child cannot be 
placed for adoption until parental rights have been terminated. 
To allow adoptive parents to become hopeful and make arrange-
ments to receive the children, only to be disappointed if the 
court does not order termination, violates the dictates of 
good conscience. In the present case, the caseworker did in-
dicate that the Division of Family Services planned to arrange 
for the adoption of the Summers children, and possible adoptive 
parents have been located. But no adoption arrangements can or 
should be made until these proceedings are completed. There-
fore, Appellant's argument that it was error to terminate prior 
to planning for adoption is not valid. 
As Justice Callister noted in his dissent in In Re State, 
it is important that the Juvenile Court be allowed some latitude 
of discretion. His policy discussion follows: 
This court cannot exercise the discretion 
which the juvenile court might, and in some 
cases ought to have exercised. We cannot, 
under the guise of reviewing an abuse of dis-
cretion by the juvenile court, substitute our 
judgment for that of the juvenile court. Every 
presumption should be indulged in favor of the 
proper exercise by the juvenile court of its 
discretion in granting or denying a hearing in 
these cases. 
This court should take a realistic view 
of such situations and recognize that unless 
the juvenile court is in fact allowed some 
latitude of discretion, it will be practically 
helpless in placing children found under such 
unfortunate circumstances, and the Department 
of Public Welfare will be required to bear the 
whole burden of their upbringing while irre-
sponsible parents continue to have more children 
and to continue in their dissolute ways, and 
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leave the responsibility of their care 
to others. On the other hand if the 
juvenile judge is clothed with some 
discretion and authority, the children 
can be placed, as has been done in this 
case with four of the children, where 
they may have a more wholesome well ad-
justed life with a promise to build lives 
of that character for themselves and their 
families; whereas, failure to allow the 
court such prerogative tends to keep the 
situation unsettled and to disturb it so 
that permanent placements cannot be made* 
360 P.2d at 492. 
The Juvenile Court did not, in the present case, abuse 
its discretion nor did it deny appellant his right to due 
process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has relied upon two main arguments to support
 A 
his request for reversal of the juvenile court order terminating 
his parental rights. He has first argued that the findings of 
the court were improperly entered and not supported by the 
record. As Respondent has clearly shown, case law establishes 
the propriety in the circumstances of the instant case of both 
the finding that Appellant abandoned his children and that he 
is unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct seriously detri-
mental to the children. Further, applying the facts and evidence 
established in the record, Respondent has unequivocally supported 
the above findings as entered by the juvenile court in ordering 
the termination of Appellant's parental rights* 
Appellant has also argued that the juvenile court abused 
its discretion in denying his Motion to Produce Additional 
Testimony or the Alternative Motion For a New Trial. As Respon-
dent has shown, the juvenile court gave Appellant every opportunity 
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to be heardf consistent with due process. Now, after an adverse 
decision, Appellant seeks to blame the juvenile court for his 
own failure to appear. Appellant disregarded his opportunity to 
personally contest the termination of parental rights petition. 
The record and applicable law clearly support the decision of 
the juvenile court to deny Appellant's post-hearing motions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
/ PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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